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Review: Consent of the Networked
April 17, 2012 in Books by The China Beat
By Anne Henochowicz

The last two years have seen much talk about the
explosion of social media as a tool of real change, most notably during the Arab Spring.
Tunisia’s and Egypt’s revolutions were powered by Twitter and Facebook. Though these sites
are blocked in China, Sina’s microblogging platform Weibo has also changed the political game
in that country, forcing government accountability after last summer’s high-speed train crash in
Wenzhou and contributing to the very public downfall of former Chongqing Party Secretary Bo
Xilai. Weibo’s power may also lead to its demise. After rumors of a coup attempt spread
recently, the comment function on posts was disabled from March 31 through April 3.
The rise of Weibo, concurrent with a tightening of restrictions on activists, has focused the
world’s attention on Chinese social media. The cat-and-mouse game Chinese “netizens” play
with the censors has made it onto the pages of the New York Times, The Economist, and the
International Herald Tribune. What is so often missing, though, from the discussion of Internet
freedom in China, as in the Middle East, is the role that “free world” business and politics plays
in the mechanisms of censorship.
Rebecca MacKinnon’s Consent of the Networked is a synthesis of the global debate over Internet
freedom. MacKinnon has extensive journalistic experience in China, but her book encompasses

the breadth of Internet issues worldwide. The CNN Beijing bureau chief from 1998-2001,
MacKinnon went on to become a fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and later
the Berkman Center for Internet and Society. She is the co-founder of Global Voices, an
international citizen journalist blog. She is currently a fellow at the New America Foundation
and on the Global Network Initiative’s board of directors.
MacKinnon argues that Internet freedom depends on the “consent of the networked.” Like John
Locke’s consent of the governed, the denizens of the Internet, its “netizens,” relinquish a certain
amount of personal freedom in exchange for security. In the physical world, we accept that we
need the police to protect us from harm. If the police are too weak, we don’t feel safe in public.
But if the police have too much power, they bring a new kind of danger into our lives. Like realworld institutions, our virtual hegemons should guarantee our freedoms, not encroach on them.
The trouble with the Internet is that the kingdoms governing it—Facebook, Google, Yahoo—
make their own rules. They are not accountable to netizens. They may apply their laws arbitrarily
or change them without warning. Facebook, for example, has a loosely-enforced real-name
policy. Zhao Jing, the Beijing blogger and journalist who goes by the pen name Michael Anti,
found his Facebook account shuttered in 2011 for violation of the company’s real-name policy.
But the same policy has not been applied to Beast, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s dog.
Zuckerberg argues that netizens should have nothing to hide online. But control over how much
personal information exists about us online is vital to our real-world safety, whether we inhabit
democracies or authoritarian regimes. Under South Korea’s short-lived real-identification
registration requirement, netizens’ identities on the blogging platform Daum, YouTube, and
other sites were tied to real names, ID numbers, and addresses. This allowed for the 2009 arrest
of Park Dae-sung for “spreading false information to harm the public interest,” even though he
blogged under a pseudonym. The real-name regulations remained until July 2011, when the
national ID numbers of of about 35 million people were stolen from a popular Korean Web
portal.
China’s four biggest microblogging platforms, including Sina Weibo, are phasing in real-ID
requirements as of March 16. Users can keep their unregistered accounts, but eventually will not
be able to post without giving their real names and mobile phone numbers. This not only
threatens Weibo’s freewheeling atmosphere, but also leaves users vulnerable to identity theft.
It is easy to pin all of the on blame the Chinese government. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and
Google all had their time in China, before some “mass incident” or conflict between the
company and the government threw it on the other side of the Great Firewall. But we should not
forget that American Internet and technology companies have also played a role in online
censorship. Perhaps the most egregious example is the case of journalist Shi Tao, arrested in
2004 after sending an email from his Yahoo account to the organization Democracy Forum about
directives for reporters leading up to June 4. At the Beijing state security bureau’s request,
Yahoo turned in all of Shi’s “login times, corresponding IP addresses, and relevant email
content.” Shi is still serving his jail sentence.

In the wake of Shi’s conviction, Yahoo made significant changes to its corporate policy to keep
similar human rights violations from happening again. MacKinnon is not anti-corporation or
anti-regulation, and makes a point of talking about the efforts some governments and Internet
companies have made to protect netizens. She also emphasizes the role netizens in the free world
can play in promoting a global open Internet. While circumvention software to “climb the wall,”
anonymizers, and other tools made in the Western world for people living with a less-than-free
Internet have their place, we can do the most good for netizens worldwide by making Internet
companies at home accountable to us.
American netizens rose to the task earlier this year in their petition against the House’s SOPA
(Stop Online Piracy Act) and the Senate’s PIPA (Protect IP Act), bills which would punish Web
platforms allowing copyrighted material to be shared and force Internet service providers and
search engines to block access to “rogue websites.” On January 18, Wikipedia and other websites
coordinated a blackout in protest. The blackouts, petitions, and rallies influenced the
postponement of hearings on both bills.
There is plenty of talk about what is censored online, but not nearly enough about how. To
understand why online conversations evolve as they do in China—or Iran, or the US—we need
to understand the mechanisms that support those conversations. And to make the Internet free for
everyone, we need to start at home.
Anne Henochowicz is the translation coordinator for China Digital Times. She earned her
masters in Chinese literature and folklore from The Ohio State University. She lives in
Washington, D.C. You can reach her on Twitter @murasakint.

